Game theory and centrality in directed social networks by Del Pozo, Mónica et al.
	




	
	

		
















	
 !"













#$

%&


#'

('
&)&*+,

'
 











		
				
Los Cuadernos de Trabajo de la Escuela Universitaria de Estadística 
constituyen una apuesta por la publicación de los trabajos en curso y 
de los informes técnicos desarrollados desde la Escuela para servir 
de apoyo tanto a la docencia como a la investigación. 
Los Cuadernos de Trabajo se pueden descargar de la página de la 
Biblioteca de la Escuela www.ucm.es/BUCM/est/ y en la sección de 
investigación de la página del centro www.ucm.es/centros/webs/eest/
CONTACTO: Biblioteca de la E. U. de Estadística
  Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
  Av. Puerta de Hierro, S/N 
28040 Madrid 
  Tlf. 913944035 
  buc_est@buc.ucm.es 
Los trabajos publicados en la serie Cuadernos de Trabajo de la 
Escuela Universitaria de Estadística no están sujetos a ninguna 
evaluación previa. Las opiniones y análisis que aparecen publicados 
en los Cuadernos de Trabajo son responsabilidad exclusiva de sus 
autores.
ISSN: 1989-0567 
Game Theory and Centrality in Directed Social
Networks.
Mo´nica del Pozo*, Conrado Manuel* 1, Enrique Gonza´lez-Arangu¨ena*, Guillermo
Owen**
*Dpto. de Estad´ıstica e I.O. III. Escuela Universitaria de Estad´ıstica. Universidad Complutense
de Madrid. Madrid (Spain).
**Naval Postgraduate School. Dept. of Mathematics. Monterey (U.S.A.).
Abstract
In this paper we define a family of centrality measures for directed social net-
works from a game theoretical point of view. We follow the line started with our
previous paper (Go´mez et al. 2003) and besides the definition we obtain a char-
acterization of the measures and an additive decomposition in three measures that
can be interpreted in terms of emission, betweeness and reception centralities. Fi-
nally we apply the obtained results to rank the importance of players in a simplified
version of a soccer game.
Key words: Social networks, game theory, centrality, Shapley value.
Classification code: C71.
1 Introduction
A social network is a set of nodes representing people, groups, organizations, enterprises,
etc., that are connected by links showing relations or flows between them.
The social network analysis permits to understand patterns of behavior in a wide and
variated range of situations. From the description of terrorist networks to the examination
1Conrado Manuel, Dpto. de Estad´ıstica e I.O. III. Escuela Universitaria de Estad´ısitca. Universi-
dad Complutense de Madrid. 28040 Madrid (Spain). Ph.: +34913944028, Fax: +3491394064, e-mail:
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of useful patterns in clickstreams on the www or in e-mail flows, we can include the
spread of HIV in a community, the network of innovators in the European regions or the
vulnerability of an electrical network.
Network analysis study the implications of the restrictions of different actors in their
communications and then in their opportunities of relation. The fewer constraints an actor
face, the more opportunities he/she will have, and thus he will be in a more favorable
position to bargain in exchanges and to intermediate in the bargains of others that need
him, increasing his influence. Then, among other goals, network analysis try to obtain
indices, as objective as possible, to measure hypothetic or not directly observable variables
such that influence, opportunities, better position ...
Social networks analysts consider the closely related concepts of centrality and power
as fundamental properties of individuals, that inform us about aspects as who is who
in the network, who is a leader, who is an intermediary, who is almost isolated, who is
central, who is peripheral. . . Under the network approach it is assumed that this power
is inherently relational.
Social networks researchers have developed several centrality measures. Degree, Close-
ness and Betweenness centralities are without doubt the three most popular ones: Degree
centrality (Shaw, 1954; Nieminen, 1974) focuses on the level of communication activity,
identifying the centrality of a node with its degree. Closeness centrality (Beauchamp,
1965; Sabidussi, 1966) considers the sum of the geodesic distances between a given actor
and the remaining as a decentrality measure in the sense that the lower this sum is, the
greater the centrality. Closeness centrality is, then, a measure of independence in the
communications, in the relations or in the bargaining, and thus, it measure the possibility
to communicate with many others depending on a minimum number of intermediaries.
Betweenness centrality (Bavelas, 1948; Freeman, 1977) emphasizes the value of the com-
munication control: the possibility to intermediate in the relation of others. Under this
approach all possible geodesic paths between pairs of nodes are considered. The centrality
of each actor is the number of such paths in which it lies.
It is intuitively acceptable that the hub in a star is a node with a privileged position
from a relational point of view. All previous measures give to this node the higher
centrality as an actor in this position:
• can communicate directly with all the others,
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• is maximally close to the remaining and
• intermediates in the communication of all pairs of nodes.
Stephenson and Zelen (1989) abandon the geodesic path as structural element in the
definition of centrality, to introduce a measure based on the concept of information as
it is used in the theory of statistical estimation. The defined measure uses a weighted
combination of all paths between pairs of nodes, the weight of each path depending on
the information contained in it.
Bonacich (1972, 1987) suggests another concept of centrality. He proposes to measure
the centrality of different nodes using the eigenvector associated with the largest charac-
teristic eigenvalue of the adjacent matrix. The ranking of web sites as they appear in the
web search engine Google was created from this measure by Brin and Page (1998).
All previous approaches assume that the direct relation between two nodes (whenever
it exists) is symmetrical. Nevertheless it is easy to find situations in which the connections
are directed, having an specific sense: for example in the case of the network of citations
in scientific papers or in the walks across the pages in the www. It seems, then, to be
relevant to define measures of centrality (or to adapt the already existing ones) for these
special situations that can be considered, in fact, more general than the not directed ones.
Contributions in this direction can be found in White and Borgatti (1994), that generalize
the Freeman’s geodesic measures for betweenness in undirected graphs, Tutzauer (2007),
who uses the entropy as a measure of centrality in networks characterized by path-transfer
flow, and Pollner et al. (2008), that introduce an algorithm to calculate the centrality for
cohesive subgroups in directed networks.
In this paper we propose a family of centrality measures for directed graphs using
a game-theoretical point of view. The seminal work in applying game theory to the
topic of centrality for nodes in graphs is due to Grofman and Owen (1982). They used
the framework of games with restrictions in the communication introduced by Myerson
(1977, 1980). In Go´mez et al. (2003), we extend previous ideas to obtain a new family
of centrality measures with some appealing properties and the corresponding calculation
methods. Other contributions are closely related with the problem of centrality but ignore
it focusing only in the definition and properties, including characterizations, of allocation
rules for games with restrictions in the cooperation, these restrictions being given by
graphs or digraphs. An excellent survey of the work on this topic can be found in Slikker
3
and Van den Nouweland (2001). Other recent relevant contributions are debt to Amer et
al. (2007), that define a family of measures for a concept they call accessibility in oriented
networks, Van den Brink and Borm (2002) for a special type of digraphs representing
competitions, Gonza´lez-Arangu¨ena et al. (2008) where the classical Myerson value is
generalized to games with restrictions in the communication given by digraphs and Kin
and Jun (2008) on different types of connectivity in directed networks and associated
characterizations of allocations rules.
The approach we present here assumes that actors in a directed network are simultane-
ously players in a TU game which model their economic interests. The restrictions in the
communication generated by the digraph modify such game transforming it in a general-
ized TU one: the digraph restricted game. In these generalized TU games, as introduced
by Nowak and Radzik (1994), the worth of a coalition depends not only on its members
but also on the order in which they incorporate to that coalition. The centrality of each
actor is then measured as the variation of his power from the game without restrictions
to the digraph-restricted one. We will use as index of power for players in a TU game
the Shapley value, and for generalized TU ones, a parametric family of index that include
those characterized by Nowak and Radzik (1994) and Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os (1997).
Therefore a family of measures for each digraph is obtained, each member of this family
corresponding to a particular election of the a priori economic interests (the game) and
of the fixed power index.
The proposed approach is closely related with the ones in Go´mez et al. (2003) and
in Amer et al. (2007), specially in the technical framework. Moreover the introduced
measures are characterized. This characterization, is based on two properties: component
efficiency and α-directed fairness. The consideration of arcs (directed links) as units of
relation, instead of the classical links of a graph, introduces an element of asymmetry
in the bilateral relations and, as a consequence, a possible different bargaining power for
both incident nodes. This is the meaning of the α-directed fairness, a closely related
property with the α-hierarchical payoff property in Slikker et al. (2005).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the notation
and some preliminary concepts. In Section 3 the definition and some properties (including
a characterization) of the proposed family of centrality measures are given. In Section 4
each one of the measures is additively decomposed in three different ones. The obtained
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results are applied in Section 5 to obtain centralities in a simplified version of soccer.
Final conclusions appear in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Games and Generalized Games
A game in characteristic function form (a coalitional game or a TU-game) is a pair (N, v)
where v (the characteristic function) is a real function defined on 2N , the set of all subsets
of N (coalitions), that satisfies v(∅) = 0. For each S ∈ 2N , v(S) represents the (trans-
ferable) utility that players in S can obtain if they decide to cooperate. Implicitly, it is
supposed that, if the players in S form a coalition, members of S must talk together and
achieve a binding agreement.
When there is no ambiguity with respect to the set of players N , we will identify a
game (N, v) with its characteristic function v. We will denote by s the cardinality of the
coalition S ⊂ N and GN will be the 2n − 1 dimensional vector space of TU-games with
player set N . Its unanimity games basis {uS}∅6=S⊂N is defined as follows:
for all S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, uS(T ) =
{
1 S ⊂ T
0 otherwise.
As a consequence, every TU game v ∈ GN is a linear combination of those games in
the unanimity basis:
v =
∑
∅6=S⊂N
∆v(S)uS.
The coordinates {∆v(S)}∅6=S⊂N are known as the Harsany dividens, (Harsany 1963).
A game v ∈ GN is said to be superadditive if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N with S∩T = ∅,
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) holds.
A game v ∈ GN is said to be convex if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N, v(S∪T )+v(S∩T ) ≥
v(S) + v(T ) holds.
A game v ∈ GN is said to be zero-normalized if v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
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A game v ∈ GN is said to be symmetric if it exists a function f : {1, 2, . . . , n} → IR
such that for all coalition S ⊂ N , v(S) = f(s). The subespace of GN formed by symmetric
games will be noted SN . SN0 ⊂ S
N will be the subespace of games that are also symmetric
and zero-normalized.
A game v ∈ GN is said to be almost positive if all its Harsanyi dividens are nonegative.
The family of all these games will be noted APN .
A point solution for TU-games is a function which assigns a payoff vector x ∈ IRn in
every TU-game in GN . One of the most famous solutions is the Shapley value (Shapley
(1953)), ϕ, which is given by:
ϕi(N, v) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)), for all i ∈ N.
An alternative expression for the Shapley value is:
ϕi(N, v) =
∑
S⊂N,i∈S
∆v(S)
s
, for all i ∈ N.
Nevertheless, in many social or economic situations, the formation of coalitions is a
process in which not only the members of the coalitions are important but also the order
in which they appear. Taking this idea into account, Nowak and Radzik (1994) introduced
the concept of game in generalized characteristic function form.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. For each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, let us denote
by π(S) the set of all permutations or ordered coalitions of the players in S and, for
notational convenience, π(∅) = {∅}. We will denote Ω(N) = {T ∈ π(S) | S ⊂ N} the set
of all ordered coalitions with players in N .
Given an ordered coalition T ∈ Ω(N), there exists S ⊂ N such that T ∈ π(S). We
will denote H(T ) = S for the set of players in the ordered coalition T , and t = |H(T )|.
A game in generalized characteristic function form is a pair (N, v), N being the players
set and v a real function (the generalized characteristic function), defined on Ω(N) and
satisfying v(∅) = 0.
For each S ⊂ N , and for every ordered coalition T ∈ π(S), v(T ) represents the
economic possibilities of the players in S if the coalition is formed following the order
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given by T . When there is no ambiguity with respect to the set of players N , we will
identify the (generalized) game (N, v) with its (generalized) characteristic function v.
We will denote by GN the set of all generalized cooperative games with players set
N . GN is a vector space with dimension |Ω(N)| − 1. Let us observe that there exists an
isomorphism between the vector space GN and the subspace of GN consisting of all games
for which v(T ) = v(R) if H(T ) = H(R) holds. Intuitively, for games in GN , the order in
which the coalitions are formed is irrelevant.
Taking into account the previous idea we will sometimes identify each game v ∈ GN
with the (transformed) game vˆ ∈ GN defined by:
vˆ(T ) = v(H(T )) for all T ∈ Ω(N).
Each ordered coalition T = (i1, . . . , it) ∈ Ω(N) establishes a strict linear order ≺T in
H(T ), defined as follows. For all i, j ∈ H(T ), i ≺T j (i precedes j in T ) if and only if
there exist k, l ∈ {1, . . . , t}, k < l, such that i = ik, j = il.
We base on this strict linear order to define an inclusion relation in Ω(N) in this way:
for A, B ∈ Ω(N) we will say that A is included in B (noted A⊂˜B) if H(A) ⊂ H(B) and
for all i, j ∈ H(A), and i ≺A j it holds i ≺B j.
Given an ordered coalition T = (i1, i2, . . . , it) ∈ Ω(N), we will note ij(T ) = j, j =
1, 2, . . . , t, for the position of each player in that coalition. Moreover we will note T (j) =
ij, j = 1, . . . , t, for the player that is in position j in the coalition.
In this paper, a special basis of GN , the generalized unanimity basis, consisting of the
(generalized) unanimity games {wT}∅6=T∈Ω(N), will often be used. For any T ∈ Ω(N)\{∅},
the generalized characteristic function wT is defined as follows:
for all R ∈ Ω(N), wT (R) =
{
1 if T ⊂˜R
0 otherwise.
The transformed games {uˆS}∅6=S⊂N of the classical unanimity games {uS}∅6=S⊂N of
GN , can be easily expressed in terms of the {wT}∅6=T∈Ω(N) in the following way:
uˆS =
∑
T∈π(S)
wT , for each S ∈ 2
N \ {∅}.
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For a given v ∈ GN , {∆∗v(T )}∅6=T∈Ω(N) is the set of the generalized unanimity co-
efficients of v (the coordinates of v in the generalized unanimity basis). Sa´nchez and
Bergantin˜os (1997) proved that, for all T ∈ Ω(N) \ {∅}:
∆∗v(T ) =
∑
R⊂˜T
(−1)t−rv(R).
In their seminal paper on games in generalized characteristic function form, Nowak
and Radzik (1994), define and characterize a value ΨNR for these games that generalizes
the Shapley value for TU-games. For each v ∈ GN and all i ∈ N this value is given by:
ΨNRi (N, v) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
∑
T=(i1,i2,...,it)∈π(S)
(n− t− 1)!
n!
(v(i1, i2, . . . , it, i)− v(T )).
An alternative expression for this value based on the generalized unanimity coeficients
of v is:
ΨNRi (N, v) =
∑
T∈Ω(N),i(T )=t
∆∗v(T )
t!
.
Later, Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os (1997) define and study another generalization, ΨSB
of the Shapley value for TU-games to this class of generalized games, differing from the
former in null player and symmetry axioms. This value can be obtainined from the two
alternative equivalent following expressions:
ΨSBi (N, v) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
∑
T=(i1,i2,...,it)∈π(S)
(n− t− 1)!
n!(t+ 1)
t+1∑
l=1
(v(i1, . . . , il−1, i, il, . . . , it)− v(T )).
ΨSBi (N, v) =
∑
T∈Ω(N),i∈H(T )
∆∗v(T )
t!t
.
In this paper we use a parametric family of functions defined on GN , {Ψα}α∈[0,1]. Each
one of them can be considered as a particular point solution. They are defined, for each
generalized TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN and all i ∈ N by:
Ψαi (N, v) =
∑
T∈Ω(N),i∈H(T )
∆∗v(T )
αt−i(T )
t!
∑t−1
l=0 α
l
, α ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
The defined family includes the point solutions ΨNR and ΨSB. In particular ΨNR = Ψ0
(it is implicit in (1) the abuse of notation 00 = 1) and ΨSB = Ψ1.
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The idea behind this point solution is that, in a unanimity game wT we share the
reward among the non dummy players, no equitatively (as Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os does)
nor all for the last one (as Nowak and Radzik does) but proportionaly to the position of
the player in T .
2.2 Graphs and Directed Graphs
A graph is a pair (N, γ), N = {1, 2, . . . , n} being a finite set of nodes and γ a collection
of links (edges or ties), that is, unordered pairs {i, j} with i, j ∈ N , i 6= j. When there is
no ambiguity with respect to N , we will refer to the graph (N, γ) as γ.
If {i, j} ∈ γ, we will say that i and j are directly connected in γ. We will say that i
and j are connected in γ if it is possible to join them by a sequence of edges from γ.
Given a graph (N, γ), the notion of connectivity induces a partition of N in connected
components. Two nodes i and j, i 6= j, are in the same connected component if and only if
they are connected. By connected component we mean what is also known as a maximal
connected subset. N/γ denotes the set of all connected components in γ.
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N, d), N = {1, 2, . . . n} being a set of nodes
and d a subset of the collection of all ordered pairs (i, j), i 6= j, of elements of N . Each
pair (i, j) ∈ d is called an arc. In the following, if there is no ambiguity with respect to
N , we will refer to the digraph (N, d) as d. We will denote DN for the set of all possible
digraphs with nodes set N .
Given a digraph (N, d), if (i, j) ∈ d, we will say that i is directly connected with j.
Obviously, if i is directly connected with j, the reverse is not necessarily true. If i is
not directly connected with j in the digraph, it may still be possible to connect them,
provided that there are other nodes through which we can do so. We will say that i is
connected with j in the digraph (N, d) if there is a directed path connecting them, i.e.,
if there exists an ordered sequence of nodes in N , (i1, i2, . . . , is), such that i1 = i, is = j
and (il, il+1) ∈ d for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s− 1}.
We will say that an ordered set T = (i1, i2, . . . , it) ∈ Ω(N) is connected in the digraph
(N, d) if, for all l = 1, . . . , t− 1, il is directly connected with il+1 in the digraph (N, d).
2
2This concept of connectedness coincides with the one in Amer, Gime´nez and Magan˜a (2007) but
differs from the used in Gonza´lez-Arangu¨ena et al. (2008) that was introduced basically with the idea of
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Given (N, d) ∈ DN , CNd is defined as:
CNd = {T ∈ Ω(N)|T is connected in (N, d)},
and we will assume ∅ /∈ CNd .
Given a digraph (N, d) ∈ DN , we can define the induced graph (N, γ(d)) as follows:
γ(d) = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N and (i, j) ∈ d or (j, i) ∈ d} .
A (not ordered) set C ⊂ N is a component in the digraph (N, d) if C ∈ N/γ(d), i.e.,
if C is a connected component in the graph (N, γ(d)). So, given a digraph (N, d) ∈ DN
we will establish a partition of N in components. We will denote by N/d the set of all
the components of the directed graph (N, d). Obviously, N/d = N/γ(d).
Let us observe that, given a component C ∈ N/d and T ∈ Ω(C), it is possible that T
can be not connected ordered set in (N, d).
Then the connection concept for components we use is clearly weaker than the one
used for ordered sets. We will say that the digraph d ∈ DN is (weakly) connected if
|N/d| = 1.
We will use, for short, (N, dij) instead of (N, d\{(i, j)}) for the digraph obtained when
the arc (i, j) is removed from (N, d).
We will use, also, Li(N, d) to note the subset of d consisting of all the arcs incident on
i.
2.3 Digraph Communication Situations
A directed communication situation3 is a triplet (N, v, d) where (N, v) is a TU-game
in GN and (N, d) a digraph in DN . We will note DCN for the family of all directed
communication situations with nodes-players set N . The subset of DCN corresponding to
generalizing the Myerson value to the case of games restricted to digraphs. The definition of connectedness
in digraphs is not so obvious as in the case of graphs. In Kun and Jim (2008) several alternative concept
of connection in digraphs are used.
3This denomination is used in Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001) with a different meaning.
Nevertheless we have preferred to maintain it in order to emphasize the generalization of the classical
concept of communication situation to this new setting of directed graphs.
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directed communication situations in which the game is a symmetric one will be noted as
DCNS , whereas DC
N
APS will correspond to directed communication situations in which the
game is simultaneously almost positive and symmetric. The respective subsets of DCNS
and DCNAPS formed by directed communication situations in which the game is also a
0-normalized one will be noted DCNS0 and DC
N
APS0
.
3 A family of centrality measures for digraph com-
munication situations
In order to define centrality measures for digraphs using a game theoretical approach, let
us consider (N, uS, d) ∈ DC
N , S ⊂ N , where (N, uS) ∈ G
N is a unanimity game and
(N, d) ∈ DN a digraph. The restrictions in the communication modeled by a digraph
affect to the worth of the several coalitions and thus a new game arises to take into
account this constrains. This is the classical approach to study the problem of games
with resctrictions in the communications as in Myerson (1977,1980).
Given the directed communication situation (N, uS, d), the digraph-restricted game
(N, udS) can be interpreted as the game of connect S in d, and in our approach, we
propose to consider all the connected ordered coalitions T ∈ π(S). This leads to define
the game (N, udS) as the generalized TU one with (generalized) characteristic function
given by
udS =
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
d
w
T
.
We will extend previous definition to DCN by linearity and thus, given (N, v, d) ∈
DCN , we define the digraph-restricted game (N, vd) ∈ GN as the one with generalized
characteristic function:
vd =
∑
∅6=S⊂N
∆v(S)u
d
S.
In the next proposition we will give an expression for vd in terms of v.
Proposition 3.1 Given (N, v, d) ∈ DCN , the generalized characteristic function of the
digraph restricted game (N, vd) is given by:
vd(T ) =
∑
∅6=R⊂˜T
λdv(R)v(H(R)),
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being λdv(R) =
∑
R⊂˜K⊂˜T,K∈CN
d
(−1)k−r.
Proof:
vd(T ) =
∑
∅6=S⊂N
∆v(S)u
d
S(T ) =
∑
∅6=S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
K∈π(S)∩CN
d
wK(T ) =
=
∑
K⊂˜T, K∈CN
d
∆v(H(K)) =
∑
K⊂˜T, K∈CN
d
∑
∅6=L⊂H(K)
(−1)k−lv(L) =
=
∑
∅6=R⊂˜T
∑
R⊂˜K⊂˜T, K∈CN
d
(−1)k−rv(H(R)),
last equality holding because there exists a unique permutation of R, L, (L = H(R)) such
that R⊂˜K⊂˜T .
Once the previous framework is obtained we pass to define a family of centrality
measures.
Definition 3.1 Given (N, v, d) ∈ DCN the centrality of node i ∈ N , noted Kαi (N, v, d) is
defined as:
Kαi (N, v, d) = Ψ
α
i (N, v
d)− ϕi(N, v).
As it is obvious from that definition, we are assuming that the centrality of a given
node can be measured as the difference in its allocation when the restrictions in the com-
munication given by the digraph are taking into account and the corresponding allocation
when the restrictions do not exist.
Interpreting Shapley value and Ψα, α ∈ [0, 1] as indices of power in GN and GN
respectively, the defined measure of centrality for a given node can be viewed as the
variation in its power due to the position in the digraph.
In order to avoid a priori differences among players given by different status in the
original game, that can contaminate the obtained centrality, we propose to use symmetric
games (N, v). As a consequence, the term ϕi(N, v) is equal for all players and then,
removing it, only a shift transformation is produced. Another shift transformation (that
will permit us to associate null centrality to isolated nodes) is obtained when replacing
each symmetric game by its zero-normalized version. Then when defining the centrality
we will restrict ourselves to symmetric and zero-normalized games.
From now on we will use this alternative definition of centrality:
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Definition 3.2 Given (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0, α ∈ [0, 1] the centrality of node i ∈ N is defined
as:
καi (N, v, d) = Ψ
α
i (N, v
d).
α ∈ [0, 1] evaluates the assymmetry of the arcs impact and can be view as a discount
factor of the importance of the iniciator node versus the receiver one. Of course, chossing
a value for α, is a critical aspect of the defined family of measures. This value can be
obtained from empirical information, from the relative importance of to be initiator in a
relation... Obviously similar results to those proposed here are obtained if we change α
by 1
α
assuming that the initiator node is in a better position than the receiver node.
As a consequence, the special case α = 1 can be interpreted as the one in which
both incident nodes in an arc play symmetrical roles. Then it is natural to assume that
swiching these roles for all players, the respective centralities are not affected. This result
is stated in next proposition.
Proposition 3.2 For α = 1, κ1(N, v, d) = κ1(N, v, d) and so when the measure considers
symmetrically both nodes incident in an arc, the obtained centralities coincide with those
obtained changing the sense of the arcs.
Proof: For each S ⊂ N we have udS =
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
d
wT . For T = (i1, i2 . . . , ir−1, ir)
let us note T = (ir, ir−1, . . . , i2, i1). Then T ∈ CNd if and only if T ∈ C
N
d
, and thus
udS =
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
d
wT .
Using that Ψ1i (N,wT ) does not depend on i for all i ∈ T (and 0 if i /∈ T ) we have that
Ψ1i (N,wT ) = Ψ
1
i (N,wT ) for all i ∈ N . Then, by the linearity of the centrality measure,
we have
κ1i (N, v, d) = κ
1
i (N, v, d)
In a sociological context it is assumed that, adding an arc between two given nodes
increases (or at least does not decreas) their centralities. In allocation rules for commu-
nication situations, this property is known as stability. So, it is reasonable to explore the
extent to which this property is verified by the proposed family of centrality measures.
Unfortunately, in order to satisfy this property, we must restrict ourselves to use games
in a subset of GN . Next example illustrates this point.
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Example 3.1 Consider the directed communication situation (N, v, d) with N =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, v the symmetric and superadditive, (and even convex) game
v(S) =
7∑
k=2
(
s
k
)
(−1)k and d = {(2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (2, 6), (2, 7)}. Consider also the di-
rected communication situation (N, v, d′) with d′ = d ∪ {(1, 2)}.
1 2 
3
4
5
6
7
(N,d' ) 
1 2 
3
4
5
6
7
(N,d ) 
As v =
∑
S⊂N, s≥2
(−1)suS and using the definition of the restricted game, we have:
vd = w(2,3) + w(2,4) + w(2,5) + w(2,6) + w(2,7),
vd
′
= w(1,2) + w(2,3) + w(2,4) + w(2,5) + w(2,6) + w(2,7)−
−w(1,2,3) − w(1,2,4) − w(1,2,5) − w(1,2,6) − w(1,2,7).
and thus, for α ∈ [0, 1],
κα1 (N, v, d) = 0, and κ
α
1 (N, v, d
′) =
α
2!(1 + α)
−
5α2
3!(1 + α+ α2)
.
It is easy to see that, for α >
√
7−1
2
, κα1 (N, v, d) > κ
α
1 (N, v, d
′).
Of course, previous example points out an undesirable aspect of the proposed meaures.
This behaviour can be avoided if we restrict ourselves to the family APN ⊂ GN , that will
permit us to guarantee the stability. Even this restriction can be viewed as a weakness of
the defined measures, on the other hand, it must be pointed out that this type of games
incentivate the formation of coalitions in a stronger way than, for example superadditive
games or convex games, giving a positive dividend to each coalition. So, from now on,
we will suppose that the economical interests of players satisfy this strong tendency to
cooperate. Nevertheless, in order to obtain the maximum degree of generality possible
about the properties of Ψα(N, vd), the results will be written assuming the lesser restrictive
set of hypothesis.
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Several of the games in this family have an intuitive interpretation as communication
games:
(a) The game (N, vk), k = 2, . . . , n with characteristic function,
vk(S) =
{
k!
(
s
k
)
k = 1, . . . , s
0 k = s+ 1, . . . , n,
represents, for each subset S ⊂ N , the number of ordered subcoalitions of S with
size k that can be formed.
(b) The zero-normalized conferences game is v =
n∑
k=2
vk.
(c) And more generally any linear positive combination v =
n∑
k=2
µkvk of vk games with
µi ≥ 0, i = 2, . . . , n.
Proposition 3.3 Given a directed communication situation (N, v, d) ∈ DCNAPS0 and
(i, j) ∈ d:
καl (N, v, d) ≥ κ
α
l (N, v, d
ij) for l ∈ N and α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: Consider first the unanimity games (N, uS), S ⊂ N , s ≥ 2. Obviously (N, uS) ∈
APN ∩ SN0 . Then, for all l ∈ N and all α ∈ [0, 1],
καl (N, uS, d) =
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
d
Ψαl (N,wT ) ≥
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
dij
Ψαl (N,wT ) = κ
α
l (N, uS, d
ij),
the inequality holding because CN
dij
⊂ CNd and Ψ
α
l (N,wT ) ≥ 0. The result for a more
general directed communication situation (N, v, d) with (N, v) ∈ APN ∩ SN0 is deduced
using the linearity of the measure and the fact that all dividends are nonegative.
As a straightforward consequence we obtain the stability of the defined measures.
Using previous proposition is easy to see that the centrality of a given node i ∈ N is
minimal when i is an isolated node.
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Proposition 3.4 Given (N, v, d) ∈ DCNAPS0 and i ∈ N such that Li(N, d) = ∅ (i.e. i is
an isolated node) then:
0 = καi (N, v, d) ≤ κ
α
i (N, v, d
′),
for all (N, v, d′) ∈ DCNAPS0 and all α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: Given (N, v, d) ∈ DCNAPS0 , i ∈ N and α ∈ [0, 1], using previous proposition
sequentially:
καi (N, v, d
′) ≥ καi (N, v, d
′ \ Li(N, d′)) = v({i}) = 0 = καi (N, v, d), for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Next property stablishes that the centrality of a given node depends only on the
component to which it belongs. So, we can calculate centralities in a local way.
Proposition 3.5 Let (N, v, d) ∈ DCNAPS0 and let N1, N2 ⊂ N with N1 ∪ N2 = N and
N1 ∩ N2 = ∅. Let dl = {(i, j) ∈ d such that (i, j) ∈ Nl}, l = 1, 2 and suppose d verifies
d = d1 ∪ d2. Then, for i ∈ Nl, l = 1, 2 and α ∈ [0, 1]:
καi (N, v, d) = κ
α
i (Nl, v|Nl , dl).
Proof: The characteristic function vd satisfies for all T ⊂ N , vd(T ) = vd(T ∩N1)+
vd(T ∩N2) = v
d1(T ∩N1) + v
d2(T ∩N2) = (v|N1)
d1(T ) + (v|N2)
d2(T ), and thus,
vd = (v|N1)
d1 + (v|N2)
d2 .
Without lost of generality, suppose i ∈ N1, therefore:
Ψαi (N, v
d) = Ψαi (N1, (v|N1)
d1) = καi (N1, v|N1 , d1), α ∈ [0, 1].
In order to compare centralities of nodes belonging to different digraphs, it would be
interesting to know the total centrality in a given digraph, i.e., the sum of the centralities
of different actors in the network.
Next proposition stablishes that the defined measures are efficient in connected di-
graphs. In this case we can drop the hypothesis of being the game almost positive.
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Proposition 3.6 For all α ∈ [0, 1], κα is efficient in digraphs, i.e.: given (N, v, d) ∈
DCNS0, (N, d) connected, we have:∑
i∈N
καi (N, v, d) =
∑
T∈π(N)
vd(T )
n!
.
Proof: For α ∈ [0, 1],
∑
i∈N κ
α
i (N, v, d) =
∑
i∈N Ψ
α
i (N, v
d).
So, all that is left to prove is the average efficiency of Ψα. In fact, for all (N,w) ∈ GN :∑
i∈N
Ψαi (N,w) =
∑
i∈N
Ψαi (N,
∑
∅6=T∈Ω(N)
∆∗w(T )wT ) =
=
∑
i∈N
∑
∅6=T∈Ω(N)
∆∗w(T )Ψ
α
i (N,wT ) =
∑
∅6=T∈Ω(N)
∆∗w(T )
∑
i∈N
Ψαi (N,wT ) =
=
∑
∅6=T∈Ω(N)
∆∗w(T )
1
t!
=
∑
∅6=T∈Ω(N)
1
t!
∑
∅6=R⊂˜T
(−1)t−rw(R) =
∑
∅6=T∈Ω(N)
 ∑
∅6=R⊂˜T
(−1)t−r
t!
w(R).
Moreover, taking l = t− r we have:
∑
∅6=R⊂˜T
(−1)t−r
t!
=
n−r∑
l=0
(
r + l
l
)(
n− r
l
)
l!
(−1)l
(r + l)!
=
=
1
r!
n−r∑
l=0
(
n− r
l
)
(−1)l =
{
1
n!
if r = n
0 otherwise
and therefore, ∑
i∈N
Ψαi (N,w) =
∑
R∈π(N)
w(R)
n!
.
And taking w = vd, the result is proved.
Next corollary (which proof is straightforward) extends to the general case the result
in Proposition 3.6.
Corollary 3.1 For α ∈ [0, 1], κα satisfy components efficiency i.e.: given (N, v, d) ∈
DCNS0 , if N/d = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck}, for j = 1, 2, . . . , k,∑
i∈Cj
καi (N, v, d) =
∑
T∈π(Cj)
vd(T )
cj!
.
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Example 3.2 Consider the following directed communication situations
(N, v, d1), (N, v, d2), and (N, v, d3) where (N, d1), (N, d2), (N, d3) are the out-
star, the in-star and the oriented left-right chain with four nodes, respectively, i.e.,
d1 = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4)}, d2 = {(2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1)} and d3 = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)}, and
the game v = v2 + v3 + v4. Then:
1 3
2
4
1 3
2
4
1 2 3 4 
(N,d
1
) (N,d 
2
) (N,d 
3
)
vd1 = 2!(w(1,2) + w(1,3) + w(1,4)),
vd2 = 2!(w(2,1) + w(3,1) + w(4,1)),
vd3 = 2!(w(1,2) + w(2,3) + w(3,4)) + 3!(w(1,2,3) + w(2,3,4)) + 4!w(1,2,3,4),
κα(N, v, d1) =
(
3α
1 + α
,
1
1 + α
,
1
1 + α
,
1
1 + α
)
, α ∈ [0, 1].
κα(N, v, d2) =
(
3
1 + α
,
α
1 + α
,
α
1 + α
,
α
1 + α
)
, α ∈ [0, 1].
κα(N, v, d3) =
(
α
1 + α
+
α2
1 + α+ α2
+
α3
1 + α+ α2 + α3
, 1 +
α2 + α
1 + α+ α2
+
α2
1 + α+ α2 + α3
,
1 +
1 + α
1 + α+ α2
+
α
1 + α+ α2 + α3
,
1
1 + α
+
1
1 + α+ α2
+
1
1 + α+ α2 + α3
)
, α ∈ [0, 1].
The total centralities, which do not depend on α as Corollary 3.1 shows, are
4∑
i=1
καi (N, v, d1) =
4∑
i=1
καi (N, v, d2) = 3 and
4∑
i=1
καi (N, v, d3) = 6.
As it is obvious, with these measures, the centrality of the hub in an in-star is greater
than the corresponding one in the out-star and conversely for satellites. In this case, any
normalization (based on the sum) can be avoided as the total sum coincides in both stars.
In the chain d3, centrality incresases from node 1 to 3, for all α ∈ [0, 1]. When
comparing node 3 and 4 the ranking depends on the value of α. These results, that seem
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to be not very appealling, will be interpreted when we consider the decomposition of the
measures in next section. On the other hand, for α ∈ [0, 1] 1
6
καi (N, v, d3) ≤
1
3
κα1 (N, v, d2),
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and then the normalized centrality of each node in the four-nodes oriented
chain is lesser than the corresponding normalized centrality for the hub of a four-nodes
in-star.
Finally, when comparing 1
3
κα1 (N, v, d1) with
1
6
καi (N, v, d3), the ranking depends on the
value of α.
Another question of interest, from sociological point of view, is the impact that has
in a pair of individuals to remove a directed relation between them. The defined family
of measures covers the possibility of an asymmetrical impact on the two individuals that
break their directed relation. Both change their centralities, but the initiator-node one
only in a proportion α ∈ [0, 1] that the receiver one. We will refer to this property as
α-directed fairness (for α ∈ [0, 1]).
Proposition 3.7 κα satisfies the α-directed fairness property, i.e.: given (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0
and i, j ∈ N such that (i, j) ∈ d, for all α ∈ [0, 1],
καi (N, v, d)− κ
α
i (N, v, d
ij) = α[καj (N, v, d)− κ
α
j (N, v, d
ij)].
Proof: Let us first consider the unanimity game (N, uS) , S ⊂ N with s ≥ 2. Then,
udS − u
dij
S =
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
d
,T (j)=T (i)+1
wT ,
and therefore
καi (N, uS, d)− κ
α
i (N, uS, d
ij) =
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
d
,T (j)=T (i)+1
αt−T (i)
t!
∑t−1
r=0 α
r
=
= α
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
d
,T (j)=T (i)+1
αt−(T (i)+1)
t!
∑t−1
r=0 α
r
= α[καj (N, uS, d)− κ
α
j (N, uS, d
ij)].
As κα is linear in v, the result is proved
Again, if we assume that removing an arc the centrality of incident nodes must decrease
or at least not increase, we must use almost positive games. In this case the impact is
nonegative for both players but minor for the iniciator one than for the receiver one. If
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the game is not almost positive the centrality of both can increase, but in this case the
corresponding variation of the reveiver-node more.
Previous properties are interesting by themselves as they reflect appelling aspects for
a measure to be considered as a centrality one. But it is even more important from a
theorical point of view is the fact that the last two characterize the defined family of
centrality measures when α 6= 0. The proof is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 For each α ∈ (0, 1], κα : DCNS0 → IR
n is the unique function defined on
DCNS satisfying components efficiency and α-directed fairness.
Proof: As it is already proved, κα : DCNS0 → IR
n satisfies components efficiency and
α-directed fairness. Conversely, suppose α ∈ (0, 1] and ξα : DCNS0 → IR
n is a function
satisfying these two properties. We will prove, by induction on the number of arcs, |d|, in
(N, d), that ξα(N, v, d) = κα(N, v, d) for all (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0 and all α ∈ (0, 1].
If |d| = 0, we have N/d = {{1}, . . . , {n}} and thus by components efficiency
ξαi (N, v, d) = v({i}) = 0 = κ
α
i (N, v, d), i ∈ N .
Suppose, then, that ξα = κα for all α ∈ (0, 1] and all (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0 with |d| < m
and consider (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS with |d| = m. For (h, k) ∈ d, using the induction hypothesis
and the fact that both functions ξα and κα satisfy α-directed fairness we have:
ξαh (N, v, d)− αξ
α
k (N, v, d) = ξ
α
h (N, v, d
hk)− αξαk (N, v, d
hk) =
= καh(N, v, d
hk)− ακαk (N, v, d
hk) = καh(N, v, d)− ακ
α
k (N, v, d),
and thus
ξαh (N, v, d)− κ
α
h(N, v, d) = α[ξ
α
k (N, v, d)− κ
α
k (N, v, d)]. (2)
Consider i ∈ N and C ∈ N/d the component to which i belongs. If |C| = 1 it
is trivial by components efficiency that ξαi = κ
α
i for α ∈ (0, 1]. So, suppose there is
j ∈ C, j 6= i. It exists a sequence (not necessarily unique) i0 = i, i1, . . . , il−1, il = j, such
that for t = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1, (it, it+1) ∈ d or (it+1, it) ∈ d , or both possibilities.
Let us define rt(i, j) =
{
1 if (it, it+1) ∈ d
−1 otherwise .
Obviously rt(i, j) depends on the considered sequence i0 = i, i1, . . . , il = j but this
fact is notationaly ignored. Then, using (2) sequentially:
ξαi (N, v, d)− κ
α
i (N, v, d) = α
∑ l−1
t=0 rt(i,j) [ξαj (N, v, d)− κ
α
j (N, v, d)].
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Therefore,
∑
j∈C
[ξαj (N, v, d)− κ
α
j (N, v, d)] =
[
1 +
( ∑
j∈C, j 6=i
α
−
∑ l−1
k=0
rt(i,j)
)]
[ξαi (N, v, d)− κ
α
i (N, v, d)].
(3)
But using the components efficiency, the left hand term in (3) is zero. As 1 +∑
j∈C,j 6=i α
−
∑ l−1
t=0 rt(i,j) 6= 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1], we conclude that for i ∈ N :
ξαi (N, v, d) = κ
α
i (N, v, d), for α ∈ [0, 1],
which completes the proof.
A similar proof to the given in previous proposition shows us that the restriction of the
defined measures to DCNAPS0 can be characterized in terms of the same properties. Next
example proves that both previous properties are not sufficient to guarantee the unicity
of κ0.
Example 3.3 Given (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0, let N/d = {C1, . . . , Cr}, consider the digraphs
(Ck, d
lk), lk = 1, 2, . . . , ck where d
lk = {(ilk , j), j 6= ilk , j ∈ Ck} for each ilk ∈ Ck.
Let us define the following function ξ on DCNS0. Given (N, v, d) ∈ DC
N
S0
, for i ∈ N , let
be Ck the component of (N, d) to which i belongs.
ξi(N, v, d) = κ
0
i (N, v, d) +
∑
dlk⊂d
[
ξi(N, v, d
lk)− κ0i (N, v, d
lk)
]
,
where:
ξi(N, v, d
lk) =
{
0 if i = ilk
bi if i 6= ilk ,
(4)
with bi ∈ IR, and
∑
i6=ilk
bi =
∑
T∈π(Ck)
vd(T )
ck!
.
Let us recall κ0i (N, v, d
i) = v({i}) = 0 for the hub of an out-star as we can sequentially
remove all the arcs without change of the i-values (because of the 0-directed fairness) and
thus κ0i (N, v, d
i) = κ0i (N, v, ∅). Then by components efficiency κ
0
i (N, v, ∅) = v({i}) = 0.
Choosing the values bi, i 6= ilk of (4) in an appropiate way (which is always possible when
there exist k with ck ≥ 3), we have that ξ differs from κ
0.
Let us prove that this new function, as κ0 does, satisfies components efficiency and
0-directed fairness properties.
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The efficiency is given by the fact that:∑
i∈Ck
ξi(N, v, d) =
∑
i∈Ck
κ0i (N, v, d) +
∑
i∈Ck
∑
dlk⊂d
[
ξi(N, v, d
lk)− κ0i (N, v, d
lk)
]
=
=
∑
i∈Ck
κ0i (N, v, d) +
∑
dlk⊂d
∑
i∈Ck
[
ξi(N, v, d
lk)− κ0i (N, v, d
lk)
]
=
∑
T∈π(Ck) v
d(T )
ck!
,
this last equallity holding as the double summatory vanishes taking into account the effi-
ciency in out-stars of allocaions rules κ0 and ξ.
In order to prove that ξ satisfies 0-directed fairness, consider first the case (i, j) ∈ d,
i ∈ Ck, (i, j) /∈ d
lk for each dlk ⊂ d. Then,
ξi(N, v, d)− ξi(N, v, d
ij) = κ0i (N, v, d) +
∑
dlk⊂d
[
ξi(N, v, d
lk)− κ0i (N, v, d
lk)
]
−
−κ0i (N, v, d
ij)−
∑
dlk⊂dij
[
ξi(N, v, d
lk)− κ0i (N, v, d
lk)
]
= κ0i (N, v, d)− κ
0
i (N, v, d
ij)
as taking into account that (i, j) /∈ dlk for each dlk ⊂ d, we have dlk ⊂ dij if and only if
dlk ⊂ d. Finally, because of the 0-directed fairness of κ0, κ0i (N, v, d)− κ
0
i (N, v, d
ij) = 0.
Consider, then, the case in which (i, j) ∈ d, i ∈ Ck and it exists d
i ⊂ d (which will be
necessarily unique) such that (i, j) ∈ di. Then
ξi(N, v, d)− ξi(N, v, d
ij) = κ0i (N, v, d) +
∑
dlk⊂d
[
ξi(N, v, d
lk)− κ0i (N, v, d
lk)
]
−
−κ0i (N, v, d
ij)−
∑
dlk⊂dij
[
ξi(N, v, d
lk)− κ0i (N, v, d
lk)
]
=
= κ0i (N, v, d)− κ
0
i (N, v, d
ij) + ξi(N, v, d
i)− κ0i (N, v, d
i) = 0 + v({i})− v({i}) = 0.
Then both different functions ξ and κ0 satisfy efficiency and 0-directed fairness, and thus
these two properties not characerize κ0.
Nevertheless, we have emphasize the utility of using symmetric games where measuring
the centrality of nodes in a digraph. In next result we prove that κ0 can be characterized
in the family DCNS0 adding to the two previous ones the symmetry axiom.
Definition 3.3 We will say that nodes i and j are symmetric in the digraph (N, d) if it
exists a permutation π : N → N such that π(i) = j, π(j) = i and (k, l) ∈ d if and only if
(π(k), π(l)) ∈ d.
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Definition 3.4 A function ξ : DCNS0 → IR
n satisfies the symmetry axiom if, for all
(N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0 and all pair i, j of symmetric nodes in (N, d), ξi(N, v, d) = ξj(N, v, d)
holds.
Proposition 3.8 κ0 : DCNS0 → IR
n is the unique function defined in DCNS0 that satisfies
components efficiency, 0-directed fairness and symmetry.
Proof: It is obvious that κ0 satisfies symmetry and it is already proved that it satisfies
0-directed fairness and components efficiency. Consider ξ : DCNS0 → IR
n, satisfying these
three properties. We will prove, by backward induction on the cardiality of d, that
ξ(N, v, d) = κ0(N, v, d) for all (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0 .
If d = KN then, by symmetry and efficiency, ξi(N, v,KN) =
v(N)
n
= κ0(N, v,KN), i =
1, . . . , n.
Suppose that ξ coincides with κ0 for all (N, v, d) with |d| ≥ k and consider (N, v, d)
with |d| = k − 1. Then for i ∈ N and any (i, j) ∈ Kn \ d:
ξi(N, v, d ∪ {(i, j)})− ξi(N, v, d) = 0,
as ξ satisfies 0-directed fairnesss. Then:
ξi(N, v, d) = ξi(N, v, d ∪ {(i, j)}) = κ
0
i (N, v, d ∪ {(i, j)}),
last equality holding due to the induction hypothesis. As κ0 satifies 0-directed fairness,
κ0i (N, v, d ∪ {(i, j)}) = κ
0
i (N, v, d) and thus ξi(N, v, d) = κ
0
i (N, v, d), and the result is
proved.
Following the steps of previous proposition we can prove that the restriction of κ0 to
the DCNAPS0 is also characterized by efficiency, zero-directed fairness and symmetry.
4 A decomposition of the centrality measures
Besides the appealing properties analyzed in previous section, it must be pointed out some
miopic behaviour of the defined measures. Next example shows that, when comparing
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centralities of two nodes in different digraphs and with a different connectivity (but the
same game), it is possible to obtain for these two nodes equal proportions of the total
centrality. Obviously this can be interpreted as a weakness of the defined measures that
are not able to higlight all the differences in the connectivity between the considered
nodes.
Example 4.1 Given the directed communication situations (N, v, d) and (N, v, d′) where
N = {1, 2, 3, 4} v = v2+v3 (v2 and v3 being the previously defined communication games),
d = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 1)} and d′ = d ∪ {(1, 3), (3, 1), (2, 4), (4, 2)}. A representation
of this two digraphs is given in Figure 4.1:
(N,d')(N,d)
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
It is straightforward to see that, for each α ∈ [0, 1]: καi (N, v2 + v3, d) = 2, for each
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and thus:
καi (N, v2 + v3, d)∑4
j=1 κ
α
i (N, v2 + v3, d)
=
1
4
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Similarly, καi (N, v2 + v3, d
′) = 5, for each i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and thus
καi (N, v2 + v3, d
′)∑4
j=1 κ
α
i (N, v2 + v3, d
′)
=
1
4
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Consequently the relative centrality for each node in (N, v2 + v3, d) coincides with its
corresponding one in (N, v2 + v3, d
′). But it is obvious there exist several differences
between these digraphs (density, incident arcs, etc). This example inspires the idea that,
perhaps, the centrality is a vector measure and not a scalar one. In other words, using a
unique number to measure the centrality of a node is excesively reduccionist. Taking this
idea into account, we eill try to split each one of the defined measures in three different
ones, which can be considered as alternative centrality measures by themselves. One of
them will be interpreted as an emission measure, the second has a meaning of betweeness
and the third one will measure the reception centrality.
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This three-dimensional measure will permit us to highlight some differences in the
centrality that a single measure is unable to point out.
Definition 4.1 Given a directed communication situation (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0, we define,
for each α ∈ [0, 1], the emission centrality of node i, ǫαi (N, v, d) as:
ǫαi (N, v, d) =
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),i(T )=1
Ψαi (N,wT ) =
=
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),i(T )=1
αt−1
t!
∑t−1
k=0 α
k
.
Definition 4.2 Given a directed communication situation (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0, we define,
for each α ∈ [0, 1], the betweeness centrality of node i, βαi (N, v, d) as:
βαi (N, v, d) =
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),1<i(T )<t
Ψαi (N,wT ) =
=
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
d
(S),1<i(T )<t
αt−1
t!
∑t−1
k=0 α
k
.
Definition 4.3 Given a directed communication situation (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0, for α ∈ [0, 1],
the reception centrality of node i, ραi (N, v, d) is given by
ραi (N, v, d) =
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩CN
d
(S),i(T )=t
Ψαi (N,wT ) =
=
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),i(T )=t
1
t!
∑t−1
k=0 α
k
.
The given definitions of ǫαi (N, v, d), β
α
i (N, v, d) and ρ
α
i (N, v, d) split the total centrality
of node i, καi (N, v, d), in three quantities. Let us note for the case α = 0 κ
0(N, v, d) =
ρ0(N, v, d) and then the decomposition is inessential. They are obtained from the value
assigned to i by its position in ordered connected sets and taking into account that this
position can be the first one, the last one, or an intermediate one. Te first position in an
ordered connected set permits to initiate the communication, the intermediate positions
are clearly associated with betweeness and finally, to be at the end of each connected
chain transforms a node in a receiver one. These ideas justify the chosen notation and its
interpretation.
The first result stablishes that this new measures give us an additive decomposition
of κα.
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Proposition 4.1 For each (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0 and α ∈ [0, 1] we have,
κα(N, v, d) = ǫα(N, v, d) + βα(N, v, d) + ρα(N, v, d).
Proof: If (N, v, d) ∈ DCNS0 , α ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ N,
καi (N, v, d) =
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S)
Ψαi (N,wT ) =
=
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
 ∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),i(T )=1
Ψαi (N,wT ) +
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),1<i(T )<t
Ψαi (N,wT )+
+
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),i(T )=t
Ψαi (N,wT )
 = ∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),i(T )=1
Ψαi (N,wT )+
+
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),1<i(T )<t
Ψαi(T )(N,wT ) +
∑
S⊂N
∆v(S)
∑
T∈π(S)∩Cd(S),i(T )=t
Ψαt (N,wT ) =
= ǫαi (N, v, d) + β
α
i (N, v, d) + ρ
α
i (N, v, d)
and thus the result is proved.
Let us consider again the directed communication situations given in the Example
4.1. Previous decomposition permits us to illustrate some differences between nodes of
different digraphs having equal relative centrality.
Example 4.2 Given the directed communication situations (N, v2 + v3, d) and (N, v2 +
v3, d
′) as in Example 4.1 we have for i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
ǫαi (N, v2 + v3, d) =
α
1 + α
+
α2
1 + α+ α2
,
ραi (N, v2 + v3, d) =
1
1 + α
+
1
1 + α+ α2
,
βαi (N, v2 + v3, d) =
α
1 + α+ α2
,
ǫαi (N, v2 + v3, d
′) =
2α
1 + α
+
3α2
1 + α+ α2
,
ραi (N, v2 + v3, d
′) =
2
1 + α
+
3
1 + α+ α2
,
βαi (N, v2 + v3, d
′) =
3α
1 + α+ α2
.
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As different nodes have the same centrality inside each communication situation and the
same proportion of the total centrality when comparing both communication situations, in
order to highlight some differences, we will use the new defined measures. Let us compare
the proportion of the centrality of each node due to the emission, reception and betweeness
in both digraphs to explain the existing differences.
We have for i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
ǫαi (N, v2 + v3, d)
καi (N, v1 + v2, d)
−
ǫαi (N, v2 + v3, d
′)
καi (N, v1 + v2, d
′)
=
α
10(1 + α)(1 + α+ α2)
≥ 0,
i.e. for α ∈ (0, 1], the proportion of the centrality of each node due to emission is greater
in (N, v2 + v3, d) than in (N, v2 + v3, d
′). In the particular case α = 0 as the measure κ0
coincides with ρ0, this proportion is zero for each node in both difraphs.
If we look at the proportion of the centrality due to reception, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
ραi (N, v2 + v3, d)
καi (N, v1 + v2, d)
−
ραi (N, v2 + v3, d
′)
καi (N, v1 + v2, d
′)
=
α2
10(1 + α)(1 + α+ α2)
,
and thus, we see that it is greater too in (N, v2 + v3, d) for α ∈ (0, 1] and unchanged
for α = 0. Finally as it was expected, the proportion os the centrality due to betweeness
is higher (except for the case α = 0) for nodes in (N, v2 + v3, d
′) than for nodes in
(N, v2 + v3, d):
βαi (N, v2 + v3, d)
καi (N, v1 + v2, d)
−
βαi (N, v2 + v3, d
′)
καi (N, v1 + v2, d
′)
=
−α
10(1 + α+ α2)
≤ 0.
Let us turn now our the attention to some appealling (because of their intuitiveness)
properties of these new measures.
First proposition shows that the hub of an in-star is the node in which the proportion
of the reception centrality (with respect to the total reception centrality) is maximized.
Proposition 4.2 Given (N, v, dIS) ∈ DCNAPS0 and d
IS = {(i, 1), i ∈ N \ {1}}, for all
(N, d) ∈ DN and α ∈ [0, 1]:
ρα1 (N, v, d
IS)
κα1 (N, v, d
IS)
≥
ραi (N, v, d)
καi (N, v, d)
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (5)
Proof:
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It is obvious that for (N, v) ∈ APN ∩ SN0 , ρ
α
1 (N, v, d
IS) = κα1 (N, v, d
IS), and the left
hand side in (5) is equal to 1. Being the game almost positive ραi (N, v, d) ≤ κ
α
i (N, v, d)
for all i ∈ N and thus the result is proved.
Symmetrically we have the next result for emission centrality.
Proposition 4.3 Given (N, v, dOS) ∈ DCNAPS0 and d
OS = {(1, i), i ∈ N \ {1}}, for all
(N, d) ∈ DN and α ∈ [0, 1].
ǫα1 (N, v, d
OS)
κα1 (N, v, d
OS)
≥
ǫαi (N, v, d)
καi (N, v, d)
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (6)
In next proposition it is proved that in a oriented chain, for almost positive and
symmetrical games, the emission centrality is maximal in the inital node whereas reception
centrality is maximal in the last node. Moreover betweeness centrality increases from the
first node to the median one. We will suppose in order to simplify the proof, that the
chain has an odd number of nodes.
Proposition 4.4 Given (N, v, d) ∈ DCNAPS0 and d = {(1, 2), (2, 3), . . . , (n−1, n)} (n odd)
an oriented chain, for all α ∈ [0, 1],
ǫα1 (N, v, d) ≥ ǫ
α
i (N, v, d), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (7)
ραn(N, v, d) ≥ ρ
α
i (N, v, d), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (8)
βαm(N, v, d) ≥ β
α
i (N, v, d), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1, m being the median node. (9)
Proof: As for every (N, v) ∈ APN0 , v is a linear combination of {v2, . . . , vn} with non
negatives scalars, it is sufficient to prove the results for each vk, k = 2, . . . , n.
Then (7) holds because for k = 2, 3, . . . , n and α ∈ [0, 1]
ǫαi (N, vk, d) =

αk−1∑k−1
r=0 α
r
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− k + 1
0 i = n− k, . . . , n.
Analogously (8) is satisfied as for α ∈ [0, 1],
ραi (N, vk, d) =

1∑k−1
r=0 α
r
i = k, . . . , n
0 i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1.
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Finally, in order to prove (9), consider α ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ N, i ≤ m. An ordered set of
size k, with 3 ≤ k ≤ n, containing i, connected in (N, d) and where i has a non extreme
position is:
T (i, r, k) = (i− r + 1, i− r, . . . , i− 1, i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ k − r)
with max{2, i+ k − n} ≤ r ≤ min{i, k − 1}.
Then, for 3 ≤ k ≤ n,
βαi (N, vk, d) =
min{i,k−1}∑
r=max{2,i+k−n}
k!Ψαi (N,wT (i,r,k)) =
=
min{i,k−1,i+k−m−1}∑
r=max{2,i+k−n}
k!Ψαi (N,wT (i,r,k)) +
min{i,k−1}∑
r=i+k−m
k!Ψαi (N,wT (i,r,k)) ≤
≤
min{i,k−1,i+k−m−1}∑
r=max{2,i+k−n}
k!Ψαm(N,wT (i,r,k)) +
min{i,k−1}∑
r=i+k−m
k!Ψαi (N,wT (i,r,k)),
last inequallity holding because for r ≤ i+ k−m− 1 we have m ≤ i+ k− r− 1 and thus
m ∈ T (i, r, k) and
Ψαi (N,wT (i,r,k)) =
αk−r∑k−1
l=0 α
l
≤ Ψαm(N,wT (i,r,k)).
as m(T (i, r, k)) ≥ r.
On the other hand, (because m is the median node), for each r = i + k −
m, . . . ,min{i, k − 1},
Ψαi (N,wT (i,r,k)) =
αk−r∑k−1
l=0 α
l
,
and it exists T (m, r, k) such that Ψαm(N,wT (m,r,k)) = Ψ
α
i (N,wT (i,r,k)). Thus,
βαi (N, vk, d) ≤
min{i,k−1,i+k−m−1}∑
r=max{2,i+k−n}
k!Ψαm(N,wT (i,r,k))+
+
min{i,k−1}∑
r=i+k−m
k!Ψαm(N,wT (m,r,k)) ≤ β
α
m(N, vk, d),
this last inequality holding because βαm(N, vk, d) contains at least all the terms in both
summatories of the left hand side but possibly additional non negative terms.
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The proof of last proposition suggests some additional properties in the special case
in which the measure does not distinguish the positions of iniciator or receiver in the
communication. That is, the case α = 1.
Corollary 4.1 Given (N, v, d) ∈ DCNAPS0 and d = {(1, 2), (2, 3), . . . , (n − 1, n)} (n odd)
an oriented chain, we have
ǫ1i (N, v, d) = ρ
1
n−i+1(N, v, d), i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
β1m(N, v, d) ≥ β
1
i (N, v, d), i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
5 An example: A model of simplified soccer
Suppose a simplified game of soccer played by two teams with five players each: the goal
keeper, two defenders, two middles and one forward. We can model with an arc (i, j)
the fact that player i pass the ball to player j. If this is the last arc of a sequence of
passes, two possibilities are opened: j shots to the goal or he looses the ball which is
intercepted by a rival. Of course, a match consists of many plays (sequences of passes)
but in the following example, adding another symplification, we will suppose that the two
teams A and A’ have completed only three plays which are given by digraphs d1, d2, d3
and d′1, d
′
2, d
′
3 respectivly.
1 2 3 
5
4
3 4 5 
1 2 
1
4
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5
(N,d
1
)
(N,d
2
)
(N,d
3
)
1 5 
2 3 4 
(N,d'
1
)
2 43
2 54
1 3 
(N,d'
2
)
1 5
(N,d'
3
)
Figure 1: Teams A and A’
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Assuming d1 finishes in the unique goal of the match, we obtain the centrality (and
its decomposition) of each player in each digraph (play) and the expected centrality in
the match. This expected value assumes for team A a weight of 0.5 for the play of the
goal and equal weights for the other two plays, while for team A’ it is supposed an equal
weight for the three plays. And thus we will use καA = 1
2
κα(N, v, d1) +
1
4
κα(N, v, d2) +
1
4
κα(N, v, d3), and καA′ = 13κ
α(N, v, d′1) +
1
3
κα(N, v, d′2) +
1
3
κα(N, v, d′3) for the expected
centralities in the match for teams A and A′ respectively. Analogously ǫαA, βαA, ραA,
and ǫαA′, βαA′, ραA′ will represent the expected values for teams A and A′ for the three
components of centrality.
As it is obvious, the emission centrality of each player can be viewed as an index of
his participation in the game as initiator of plays (tipically this centrality must be higher
for goal keeper and defenders) while his betweenness centrality measures the ability to
intermediate in the plays (greater for middles) and finally his reception centrality informs
us about his shots to the goal and his lost balls (in general greater for forwards).
We will use the conferences game and several values of α ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, 0,
0.5 and 1. These values can be considered as a measure of the relative difficulty when
comparing to pass the ball versus to control it. As in the special case of α = 0 the
total centrality in each play coincides with the reception one, we will omit the remaining
components.
Moreover the total centralty of each team when comparing with others teams can
give an idea about the differences in the style when playing or in the strategy used. The
more total centrality, the more elaborated its game is. The corresponding results are
summarized in the following tables.
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Tables for team A
α = 0 καi (N, v, d1) ρ
α
i (N, v, d1) κ
α
i (N, v, d2) ρ
α
i (N, v, d2) κ
α
i (N, v, d3) ρ
α
i (N, v, d3) κ
α
i ρ
α
i
i = 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i = 2 1 1 0 0 3 3 1.25 1.25
i = 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2.75 2.75
i = 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 2.75 2.75
i = 5 4 4 2 2 0 0 2.5 2.5
α = 1 καi (N, v, d1)
ǫαi (N, v, d1)
βαi (N, v, d1)
ραi (N, v, d1)
καi (N, v, d2)
ǫαi (N, v, d2)
βαi (N, v, d2)
ραi (N, v, d2)
καi (N, v, d3)
ǫαi (N, v, d3)
βαi (N, v, d3)
ραi (N, v, d3)
καi
ǫαi
βαi
ραi
i = 1 1.333
1.333
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.083
1.083
0
0
0.937
0.937
0
0
i = 2 2.5
1.166
0.833
0.5
0
0
0
0
3.083
0.833
0.916
1.333
2.021
0.792
0.646
0.583
i = 3 3.833
1
1.5
1.333
2
0.833
0.333
0.833
2.583
0.833
0.583
1.166
3.062
0.916
0.979
1.166
i = 4 1.916
0.833
0
1.083
2
0.833
0.333
0.833
2.25
0.833
0.333
1.083
2.021
0.833
0.166
1.021
i = 5 1.416
0
0
1.146
2
0.833
0.333
0.833
0
0
0
0
1.208
0.025
0.083
0.916
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α = 0.5 καi (N, v, d1)
ǫαi (N, v, d1)
βαi (N, v, d1)
ραi (N, v, d1)
καi (N, v, d2)
ǫαi (N, v, d2)
βαi (N, v, d2)
ραi (N, v, d2)
καi (N, v, d3)
ǫαi (N, v, d3)
βαi (N, v, d3)
ραi (N, v, d3)
καi
ǫαi
βαi
ραi
i = 1 0.609
0.609
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.543
0.543
0
0
0.440
0.440
0
0
i = 2 1.838
0.619
0.552
0.666
0
0
0
0
3.086
0.476
0.704
1.904
1.690
0, 428
0.452
0.809
i = 3 3.962
0.666
1.390
1.905
2
0.476
0.285
1.238
2.838
0.476
0.552
1.809
3.190
0.571
0.904
1.714
i = 4 2.247
0.476
0
1.771
2
0.476
0.285
1.238
2.533
0.476
0.285
1.638
2.257
0.476
0.143
1.638
i = 5 2.343
0
0
2.343
2
0.476
0.285
1.238
0
0
0
0
1.671
0.119
0.071
1.481
Analogously the centralities and their decomposition for players in team A’ are:
α = 0 καi (N, v, d
′
1) ρ
α
i (N, v, d
′
1) κ
α
i (N, v, d
′
2) ρ
α
i (N, v, d
′
2) κ
α
i (N, v, d
′
3) ρ
α
i (N, v, d
′
3) κ
α
i ρ
α
i
i = 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i = 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.333 0.333
i = 4 0 0 2 2 2 2 1 1
i = 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
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α = 1 καi (N, v, d
′
1)
ǫαi (N, v, d
′
1)
βαi (N, v, d
′
1)
ραi (N, v, d
′
1)
καi (N, v, d
′
2)
ǫαi (N, v, d
′
2)
βαi (N, v, d
′
2)
ραi (N, v, d
′
2)
καi (N, v, d
′
3)
ǫαi (N, v, d
′
3)
βαi (N, v, d
′
3)
ραi (N, v, d
′
3)
καi
ǫαi
βαi
ραi
i = 1 0.5
0.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.166
0.166
0
0
i = 2 0
0
0
0
0.833
0.833
0
0
0.833
0.833
0
0
0.555
0.555
0
0
i = 3 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.333
0.5
0.333
0.5
0.444
0.166
0.111
0.166
i = 4 0
0
0
0
1.333
0.5
0.333
0.5
0.833
0
0
0.833
0.722
0.166
0.111
0.444
i = 5 0.5
0
0
0.5
0.833
0
0
0.833
0
0
0
0
0.444
0
0
0.444
α = 0.5 καi (N, v, d
′
1)
ǫαi (N, v, d
′
1)
βαi (N, v, d
′
1)
ραi (N, v, d
′
1)
καi (N, v, d
′
2)
ǫαi (N, v, d
′
2)
βαi (N, v, d
′
2)
ραi (N, v, d
′
2)
καi (N, v, d
′
3)
ǫαi (N, v, d
′
3)
βαi (N, v, d
′
3)
ραi (N, v, d
′
3)
καi
ǫαi
βαi
ραi
i = 1 0.333
0.333
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.111
0.111
0
0
i = 2 0
0
0
0
0.476
0.476
0
0
0.476
0.476
0
0
0.317
0.317
0
0
i = 3 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.285
0.333
0.285
0.666
0.428
0.111
0.095
0.222
i = 4 0
0
0
0
1.285
0.333
0.285
0.666
1.238
0
0
1.238
0.828
0.111
0.095
0.635
i = 5 0.666
0
0
0.666
1.238
0
0
1.238
0
0
0
0
0.635
0
0
0.635
Finally let us compare some of the previous centralities with other defined ranks for
nodes in digraphs.
With a similar framework to the proposed here, Amer el al. (2007) define for a
digraph communication situation (N, v, d) a new digraph restricted game vd (a gen-
eralized TU one) as vd(T ) =
∑
R∈MCTd v(H(R)) for all T ∈ Ω(N), where MC
T
d =
{R⊂˜T such that R is maximal connected set in (N, d)}. The accessibility of each given
node i is defined by:
αi(N, v, d) = Ψ
0(N, vd), for i ∈ N.
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Then, the normalized accesibilities of players of team A in the different plays:
α(N, v, d1) = (0, 0.082, 0.246, 0.294, 0.376),
α(N, v, d2) = (0, 0, 0.333, 0.333, 0.333),
α(N, v, d3) = (0, 0.313, 0.313, 0.373, 0),
are similar and with the same order for diferent nodes, to the corresponding centralities
for α = 0.
The centrality based on the eigenvector corresponding to the dominant eigenvalue of
the adjacency matrix is, for d1, d2, and d3 respectively.
(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0),
(0, 0, 0.333, 0.333, 0.333),
(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0).
In this case the differences with respect the ones we propose here are obvious. We
think that at least for these examples the eigenvalue measure does not emphasize all the
existing differences in the nodes connections.
In van den Brink and Borm (2002) authors introduce a model in which they summarize
the results of matches in sports competitions between the teams in a given set N by means
of a digraph competition. In this model, the competition digraph includes an arc (i, j) if
and only if j did not lose the match it played agains i. The model we propose in this work
is not suitable for this type of situations. The use of almost positive games implies the
stability of the associated allocation rule (for any α ∈ [0, 1]) and thus when modeling a
draw as two victories (one for each of the teams in the match) the draws will be excesively
rewarded.
6 Conclusions
This paper proposes a new instrument to measure centrality of nodes in directed networks
following our previous work (Go´mez et al. 2003). Actors in the network are simultane-
ously players in a cooperative game. This game represents the interests that motivate the
35
interactions among actors, whereas directed network imposes restrictions in the coopera-
tion. Given the (directed) network and the game, a new (generalized) restricted game is
obtained.
In the literature there are many centrality measures, but they usually assume the links
are undirected, i.e., both agents connected by a link equally benefit from its existence. In
the present paper, we will consider the directed case.
In our proposal, the centrality of nodes is measured as the difference between:
(i) the Shapley value (this is assumed to be the node’s payoff/power when no digraph
is binding the interaction among agents), and
(ii) a new value for generalized TU games belonging to a parametric family that
contains the two existing ones defined by Nowak and Radzik (1994) and Sa´nchez and
Bergantin˜os (1997). This new index is interpreted as the nodes’ payoff/power considering
the restrictions imposed by the directed network on the interaction possibilities among
agents. In particular, this index weights the specific ranking among agents derived from
the directed network structure.
The paper discuses several properties of these measures. For each α ∈ (0, 1], the corre-
sponding measure is characterized in terms of efficiency and α-directed fairness properties.
In the case α = 0, a symmetry axiom is also needed.
This characterization must be interpreted in a double sense: first, it fixes the range
of variation of our measure and second, it highlights the fact that the initiator and the
receiver do not necessarily play symmetrical roles in the type of analyzed relations. Of
course, other measures can be obtained with different properties and with alternative
characterizations. Even, the proposed measures probably admit characterizations based
on alternative properties.
In this paper we also point to some problems concerning the fact that nodes of which
centralities should be clearly different in two different networks have the same outcome of
the measure. This inspires us the idea that the proposed measures are a sort of a specific
module of the centrality. This centrality perhaps can be thought as a vector measure
instead of a scalar one. With this idea in mind, we additively decompose each one of
our measures in three different ones, that can be seen as components or factors of the
centrality in the dimensions of emission, reception and betweenness.
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